An intriguing property of deep neural networks is the existence of adversarial examples, which can transfer among different architectures. These transferable adversarial examples may severely hinder deep neural network-based applications. Previous works mostly study the transferability using small scale datasets. In this work, we are the first to conduct an extensive study of the transferability over large models and a large scale dataset, and we are also the first to study the transferability of targeted adversarial examples with their target labels. We study both non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples, and show that while transferable non-targeted adversarial examples are easy to find, targeted adversarial examples generated using existing approaches almost never transfer with their target labels. Therefore, we propose novel ensemble-based approaches to generating transferable adversarial examples. Using such approaches, we observe a large proportion of targeted adversarial examples that are able to transfer with their target labels for the first time. We also present some geometric studies to help understanding the transferable adversarial examples. Finally, we show that the adversarial examples generated using ensemble-based approaches can successfully attack Clarifai.com, which is a black-box image classification system.
INTRODUCTION
Recent research has demonstrated that for a deep architecture, it is easy to generate adversarial examples, which are close to the original ones but are misclassified by the deep architecture (Szegedy et al. (2013) ; Goodfellow et al. (2014) ). The existence of such adversarial examples may have severe consequences, which hinders vision-understanding-based applications, such as autonomous driving. Most of these studies require explicit knowledge of the underlying models. It remains an open question how to efficiently find adversarial examples for a black-box model.
Several works have demonstrated that some adversarial examples generated for one model may also be misclassified by another model. Such a property is referred to as transferability, which can be leveraged to perform black-box attacks. This property has been exploited by constructing a substitute of the black-box model, and generating adversarial instances against the substitute to attack the black-box system (Papernot et al. (2016a; b) ). However, so far, transferability is mostly examined over small datasets, such as MNIST (LeCun et al. (1998) ) and CIFAR-10 ( Krizhevsky & Hinton (2009) ). It has yet to be better understood transferability over large scale datasets, such as ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. (2015) ).
In this work, we are the first to conduct an extensive study of the transferability of different adversarial instance generation strategies applied to different state-of-the-art models trained over a large scale dataset. In particular, we study two types of adversarial examples: (1) non-targeted adversarial examples, which can be misclassified by a network, regardless of what the misclassified labels may be; and (2) targeted adversarial examples, which can be classified by a network as a target label. We examine several existing approaches searching for adversarial examples based on a single model. While non-targeted adversarial examples are more likely to transfer, we observe few targeted adversarial examples that are able to transfer with their target labels.
We further propose a novel strategy to generate transferable adversarial images using an ensemble of multiple models. In our evaluation, we observe that this new strategy can generate non-targeted adversarial instances with better transferability than other methods examined in this work. Also, for the first time, we observe a large proportion of targeted adversarial examples that are able to transfer with their target labels.
We study geometric properties of the models in our evaluation. In particular, we show that the gradient directions of different models are orthogonal to each other. We also show that decision boundaries of different models align well with each other, which partially illustrates why adversarial examples can transfer.
Last, we study whether generated adversarial images can attack Clarifai.com, a commercial company providing state-of-the-art image classification services. We have no knowledge about the training dataset and the types of models used by Clarifai.com; meanwhile, the label set of Clarifai.com is quite different from ImageNet's. We show that even in this case, both non-targeted and targeted adversarial images transfer to Clarifai.com. This is the first work documenting the success of generating both non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples for a black-box state-of-the-art online image classification system, whose model and training dataset are unknown to the attacker.
Related work. Transferability of adversarial examples was first examined by Szegedy et al. (2013) , which studied the transferability (1) between different models trained over the same dataset; (2) between the same model trained over disjoint subsets of a dataset; (3) between different models trained over different subsets of a dataset. However, Szegedy et al. (2013) only studied transferability on MNIST.
The study of transferability was followed by Goodfellow et al. (2014) , which attributed the phenomenon of transferability to the reason that the adversarial perturbation is highly aligned with the weight vector of the model. Again, this hypothesis was tested using MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. We show that this is not the case for models trained over ImageNet. Papernot et al. (2016a; b) examined constructing a substitute model to attack a black-box target model. To train the substitute model, they developed a technique that synthesizes a training set and annotates it by querying the target model for labels. Further, Papernot et al. (2016a) studied the transferability between deep neural networks and other models such as decision tree, kNN, etc. Nevertheless, the datasets studied in these works are also small scale, i.e., MNIST and GTSRB (Stallkamp et al. (2012) ). In this work, we study the transferability over larger models and a larger dataset without constructing the substitute model ourselves.
In a concurrent and independent work, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) showed the existence of a universal perturbation for each model, which can transfer across different images. They also show that the adversarial images generated using these universal perturbations can transfer across different models on ImageNet. However, they only examine the non-targeted transferability, while our work studies both non-targeted and targeted transferability over ImageNet.
ADVERSARIAL DEEP LEARNING AND TRANSFERABILITY

THE ADVERSARIAL DEEP LEARNING PROBLEM
We assume a classifier f θ (x) outputs a category (or a label) as the prediction. Given an original image x, with ground truth label y, the adversarial deep learning problem is to seek for adversarial examples for the classifier f θ (x). Specifically, we consider two classes of adversarial examples. A non-targeted adversarial example x is an instance that is close to x, in which case x should have the same ground truth as x, while f θ (x ) = y. For the problem to be non-trivial, we assume f θ (x) = y without loss of generality. A targeted adversarial example x is close to x and satisfies f θ (x ) = y , where y is a target label specified by the adversary, and y = y.
APPROACHES FOR GENERATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In this work, we consider three classes of approaches for generating adversarial examples: optimization-based approaches, fast gradient approaches, and fast gradient sign approaches. Each class has non-targeted and targeted versions respectively.
APPROACHES FOR GENERATING NON-TARGETED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Formally, given an image x with ground truth y = f θ (x), searching for a non-targeted adversarial example can be modeled as searching for an instance x to satisfy the following constraints:
where d(·, ·) is a metric to quantify the distance between an original image and its adversarial counterpart, and B is an upper bound placed on this distance. We refer to B as the distortion of the adversarial example. Without loss of generality, we consider model f is composed of a network J θ (x), which outputs the probability for each category, so that f outputs the category with the highest probability.
Optimization-based approach. One approach is to approximate the solution to the following optimization problem:
where 1 y is the one-hot encoding of the ground truth label y, is a loss function to measure the distance between the prediction and the ground truth, and λ is a constant to balance constraints (2) and (1), which is empirically determined. Here, loss function is used to approximate constraint (1), and its choice can affect the effectiveness of searching for an adversarial example. In this work, we choose (u, v) = log (1 − u · v), which is shown to be effective by Carlini & Wagner (2016) .
Fast gradient sign (FGS)
. Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed the fast gradient sign (FGS) method so that the gradient needs be computed only once to generate an adversarial example. FGS can be used to generate adversarial images to meet the L ∞ norm bound. The basic idea is to move the vector representation of an image along a particular direction defined by the sign of the gradient, to reach the upper bound of the allowed distortion B in (2). Formally, non-targeted adversarial examples are constructed as
Here, clip(x) is used to clip each dimension of x to the range of pixel values. In this work, we choose the range to be [0, 255] , so that x indeed corresponds to an image. We make a slight variation to Goodfellow et al. (2014) to choose (u, v) = log (1 − u · v), which is the same as used in the optimization-based approach.
Fast gradient (FG).
The fast gradient approach (FG) is similar to FGS, but instead of moving along the gradient sign direction, FG moves along the gradient direction. In particular, an adversarial example is constructed as
Here, we assume the distance metric in constraint (2), d(x, x ) = ||x − x || is a norm of x − x . The term sgn(∇ x ) in FGS is replaced by ∇x ||∇x || to meet this distance constraint. We call both FGS and FG fast gradient-based approaches.
APPROACHES FOR GENERATING TARGETED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
A targeted adversarial image x is an instance satisfying the following constraints:
where y is the target label given by the adversary. The only difference between the targeted approaches and non-targeted approaches is how to satisfy constraint (4) instead of (1). For the optimization-based approach, we approximate the solution by solving the following dual objective:
In this work, we choose the standard cross entropy loss (u,
For FGS and FG, we construct adversarial examples as follows:
where is the same as the one used for the optimization-based approach.
BLACK-BOX ATTACKS AND TRANSFERABILITY
The approaches mentioned above require explicit knowledge about the underlying model, i.e., , J, and θ. However, to search for an adversarial image of a real world system, such knowledge may not be available. In this case, the target model is a black-box to the attacker. In particular, the attacker is assumed to have black-box access to the system, i.e., retrieving the prediction results (i.e., the predictions along with confidence scores) of the images submitted to the system, but nothing else.
Previous works (Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2014) ; Papernot et al. (2016a; b) ) have shown that transferability exists between different models, i.e., the adversarial examples for one model remain adversarial for another. Such a property can be leveraged to perform black-box attacks. That is, the attacker can query the black-box system, and construct a substitute model based on the query results. Then the attacker can generate the adversarial instances for the substitute model, and these instances may transfer to the black-box system. However, such properties are only examined on small models trained over small-scale datasets, such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB. It is not clear whether the transferability phenomenon will hold for larger models trained over larger dataset.
A concurrent and independent work (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) ) shows the transferability phenomenon between models trained on ImageNet, which is one of the largest public image classification datasets; however, it only evaluates the transferability of non-targeted attacks. In this work, we show that the transferability of both non-targeted and targeted attacks exists between state-of-the-art models on ImageNet, and we demonstrate that we can generate both successful non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples for Clarifai.com, which is a black-box image classification system.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
For the rest of the paper, we focus on examining the transferability among state-of-the-art models trained over ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. (2015) ). In this section, we detail the models to be examined, the dataset to be evaluated, and the measurements to be used.
Models. We examine five networks, ResNet-50, ResNet-101, ResNet-152 (He et al. (2015) ) 1 , GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al. (2014)) 2 , and VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman (2014) ) 3 . We retrieve the pre-trained models for each network online, and evaluate the performance of these models on the ILSVRC 2012 (Russakovsky et al. (2015) ) validation set. Results are provided in Table 1 .
Dataset. It is less meaningful to examine the transferability of an adversarial image between two models which cannot classify the original image correctly. Therefore, from the ILSVRC 2012 validation set, we randomly choose 100 images, which can be classified correctly by all five models in our examination. These 100 images form our test set. To perform targeted attacks, we manually Table 2 : Transferability of non-targeted adversarial images generated using optimization-based approach between pairs of models. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. The cell (i, j) indicates the accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) evaluated over model j (column). Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in the appendix (Table 11) .
choose a target label for each image, so that its semantics is far from the ground truth. The images and target labels in our evaluation can be found on website 4 .
Measuring transferability. Given two models, we measure the non-targeted transferability by computing the percentage of the adversarial examples generated for one model that can be classified correctly for the other. We refer to this percentage as accuracy. A lower accuracy means better non-targeted transferability. We measure the targeted transferability by computing the percentage of the adversarial examples generated for one model that are classified as the target label by the other model. We refer to this percentage as matching rate. A higher matching rate means better targeted transferability. For clarity, the reported results are only based on top-1 accuracy. Top-5 accuracy's counterparts can be found in the appendix.
Distortion. Besides transferability, another important factor is the distortion between adversarial images and the original ones. We measure the distortion by root mean square deviation, i.e., RMSD, which is computed as d(x , x) = i (x i − x i ) 2 /N , where x and x are the vector representations of an adversarial image and the original one respectively, N is the dimensionality of x and x , and x i denotes the pixel value of the i-th dimension of x, which is within range [0, 255] , and similar for x i .
NON-TARGETED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we examine different approaches for generating non-targeted adversarial images.
OPTIMIZATION-BASED APPROACH
To apply the optimization-based approach for a single model, we initialize x to be x and use Adam Optimizer (Kingma & Ba (2014) ) to optimize Objective (3) . We find that we can tune the RMSD by adjusting the learning rate of Adam and λ. We find that, for each model, we can use a small learning rate to generate adversarial images with small RMSD, i.e. < 2, with any λ (e.g., even 0). However, these adversarial images cannot transfer well to other models (see Table 16 and 17 in the appendix for details).
We increase the learning rate to allow the optimization algorithm to search for adversarial images with larger distortion. In particular, we set the learning rate to be 4. We run Adam Optimizer for 100 iterations to generate the adversarial images. We observe that the loss converges after 100 iterations. Table 3 : When using the optimization-based approach for VGG-16 model to generate non-targeted adversarial images, cell (i, j) is the percentage of all transferable adversarial images that are predicted as the same wrong labels by both models i and j over all adversarial images that are misclassified by both models i and j. Notice that this table is symmetric.
Non-targeted adversarial examples transfer. We generate non-targeted adversarial examples on one network, but evaluate them on another, and Table 2 presents the results. From the table, we can observe that
• The diagonal contains all 0 values. This says that all adversarial images generated for one model can mislead the same model.
• A large proportion of non-targeted adversarial images generated for one model using the optimization-based approach can transfer to another.
Notice that an alternative method to generate non-targeted adversarial examples with large distortion is to revise the optimization objective to incorporate this distortion constraint. For example, for nontargeted adversarial image searching, we can optimize for the following objective.
Optimizing for the above objective has the following three effects: (1) minimizing
is no more than a threshold τ (too low); and (3) Penalizing the solution if d(x, x ) is too high.
In our preliminary evaluation, we found that the solutions computed from the two approaches have similar transferability. We thus omit the results for this alternative approach.
Transferable non-targeted adversarial images are classified as the same wrong labels. Previous work Goodfellow et al. (2014) reported the phenomenon that when evaluating the adversarial images, different models tend to make the same wrong predictions. This conclusion was only examined over datasets with 10 categories. In our evaluation, however, we observe the same phenomenon, albeit we have 1000 possible categories. We refer to this effect as the same mistake effect. Table 3 presents the results based on the adversarial examples generated for VGG-16. For each pair of models, among all adversarial examples that both models make wrong predictions, we compute the percentage that both models make the same mistake. These percentage numbers are from 12% to 40%, which are surprisingly high, since there are 999 possible categories to be misclassified into (see Table 33 in the appendix for the wrong predicted label distribution of these adversarial examples). Later in Section 6, we try to explain this phenomenon using decision boundaries.
FAST GRADIENT-BASED APPROACHES
We then examine the effectiveness of fast gradient-based approaches. A good property of fast gradient-based approaches is that all generated adversarial examples lie in a 1-D subspace. Therefore, we can easily approximate the minimal distortion in this subspace of transferable adversarial examples between two models. In the following, we first study the transferable minimal distortions of fast gradient-based approaches. Second, we control the RMSD to study fast gradient-based approaches' effectiveness.
ADVERSARIAL IMAGES WITH MINIMAL TRANSFERABLE RMSD
For an image x and two models M 1 , M 2 , we can approximate the minimal distortion B along a direction δ, such that x B = x + Bδ generated for M 1 is adversarial for both M 1 and M 2 . Here δ is the direction, i.e., sgn(∇ x ) for FGS, and ∇ x /||∇ x || for FG. We refer to the minimal transferable RMSD from M 1 to M 2 using FG (or FGS) as the RMSD of a transferable adversarial example x B with the minimal transferable distortion B from M 1 to M 2 using FG (or FGS). The minimal transferable RMSD can illustrate the tradeoff between distortion and transferability.
In the following, we first show that the adversarial images generated from an original image may come from multiple intervals, and thus we cannot use the binary search approach to determine the minimal transferable RMSD. Then, we approximate the minimal transferable RMSD through a linear search by sampling B every 0.1 step.
Adversarial images may come from multiple intervals along the gradient direction. In Figure 1, we show that along the gradient direction of the non-targeted objective (3) for VGG-16, when evaluating the adversarial image x B on ResNet-152, x B will soon become adversarial for small B. While B increases, however, the prediction changes back to be the correct label, then a wrong label, then the correct label again, and finally wrong labels. This indicates that along the gradient of this image, the distortions that can cause the corresponding adversarial images to mislead ResNet-152 form four intervals.
Minimal transferable RMSD using FG and FGS. Table 4 : Transferability of non-targeted adversarial images generated using fast gradient method between pairs of models. The first column reports the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. The cell (i, j) indicates the accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) evaluated over model j (column). Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in the appendix (Table 12 ).
EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSFERABILITY OF THE FAST GRADIENT-BASED
APPROACHES
Since the distortion B and the RMSD of the generated adversarial images are highly correlated, we can choose this hyperparameter B to generate adversarial images with a given RMSD. In Table 4 , we generate adversarial images using FG such that the average RMSD is almost the same as those generated using the optimization-based approach (Table 2) . We observe that the diagonal values in Table 4 are all positive, which means that FG cannot fully mislead the models. A potential reason is that, FG can be viewed as a way to approximate the optimization, but is tailored for speed over accuracy.
On the other hand, the values of non-diagonal cells in Table 4 , which correspond to the accuracies of adversarial images generated for one model but evaluated on another, are comparable with or less than their counterparts in the optimization-based approach. This shows that non-targeted adversarial examples generated by FG exhibit transferability as well.
We also evaluate FGS, but the transferability of the generated images is worse than the ones generated using either FG or optimization-based approaches. The results are in the appendix (Table 20 and 21). It shows that when RMSD is around 23, the accuracies of the adversarial images generated by FGS is greater than their counterparts for FG. We hypothesize the reason why transferability of FGS is worse to this fact.
Finally, for FG and FGS, we also observe the same mistake effect as for the optimization-based approach. The results are presented in the appendix (Table 27 and 28).
TARGETED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we examine the transferability of targeted adversarial images. Table 5 presents the results for using optimization-based approach. We observe that (1) the prediction of targeted adversarial images can match the target labels when evaluated on the same model that is used to generate the adversarial examples; but (2) the targeted adversarial images can be rarely predicted as the target labels by a different model. We call the latter that the target labels do not transfer. Even when we increase the distortion, we still do not observe improvements on making target label transfer. Some results can be found in the appendix (Table 18 ). Even if we compute the matching rate based on top-5 accuracy, the highest matching rate is only 10%. The results can be found in the appendix (Table 19) .
We also examine the targeted adversarial images generated by fast gradient-based approaches, and we observe that the target labels do not transfer as well. The results are deferred to the appendix (Table 26 ). In fact, most targeted adversarial images cannot mislead the model, for which the adversarial images are generated, to predict the target labels, regardless of how large the distortion is used. We attribute it to the fact that the fast gradient-based approaches only search for attacks in a 1-D subspace. In this subspace, the total possible predictions may contain a small subset of all labels, which usually does not contain the target label. In Section 6, we study decision boundaries regarding this issue. Table 5 : The matching rate of targeted adversarial images generated using the optimization-based approach. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) indicates that matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated for model i (row) when evaluated on model j (column). Results of top-5 matching rate can be found in the appendix (Table 13 ).
ENSEMBLE-BASED APPROACHES
We hypothesize that if an adversarial image remains adversarial for multiple models, then it is more likely to transfer to other models as well. We develop techniques to generate adversarial images for multiple models. The basic idea is to generate adversarial images for the ensemble of the models. Formally, given k white-box models f 1 , ..., f k , an original image x, and its ground truth y, the ensemble-based approach solves the following optimization problem (for targeted attack):
where y is the target label specified by the adversary, α i f i (x ) is the ensemble model, and α i are the ensemble weights, (7) is the targeted objective. The non-targeted counterpart can be derived similarly. In doing so, we hope the generated adversarial images remain adversarial for an additional black-box model f k+1 .
We evaluate the effectiveness of the ensemble-based approach. For each of the five models, we treat it as the black-box model to attack, and generate adversarial images for the ensemble of the rest four, which is considered as white-box. We evaluate the generated adversarial images over all five models. Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to the approaches evaluated in Section 3 and 4 as the approaches using a single model, and to the ensemble-based approaches discussed in this section as the approaches using an ensemble model.
Optimization-based approach. We use Adam to optimize the objective (7) with equal ensemble weights across all models in the ensemble to generate targeted adversarial examples. In particular, we set the learning rate of Adam to be 8 for each model. In each iteration, we compute the Adam update for each model, sum up the four updates, and add the aggregation onto the image. We run 100 iterations of updates, and we observe that the loss converges after 100 iterations. By doing so, for the first time, we observe a large proportion of the targeted adversarial images whose target labels can transfer. The results are presented in Table 6 . We observe that not all targeted adversarial images can be misclassified to the target labels by the models used in the ensemble. This suggests that while searching for an adversarial example for the ensemble model, there is no direct supervision to mislead any individual model in the ensemble to predict the target label.
We also evaluate non-targeted adversarial images generated by the ensemble-based approach. We observe that the generated adversarial images have almost perfect transferability. We use the same procedure as for the targeted version, except the objective to generate the adversarial images. We evaluate the generated adversarial images over all models. The results are presented in Table 7 . The generated adversarial images all have RMSDs around 17, which are lower than 22 to 23 of the optimization-based approach using a single model (See Table 2 for comparison). When the adversarial images are evaluated over models which are not used to generate the attack, the accuracy is no greater than 6%. For a reference, the corresponding accuracies for all approaches evaluated in Section 3 using one single model are at least 12%. Our experiments demonstrate that the ensemblebased approaches can generate almost perfectly transferable adversarial images. Table 6 : The matching rate of targeted adversarial images generated using the optimization-based approach. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) indicates that percentage of the targeted adversarial images generated for the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) is predicted as the target label by model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks.
Results of top-5 matching rate can be found in the appendix (Table 14) . Table 7 : Accuracy of non-targeted adversarial images generated using the optimization-based approach. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) corresponds to the accuracy of the attack generated using four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in the appendix (Table 15 ).
Fast gradient-based approach. The results for non-targeted fast gradient-based approaches applied to the ensemble can be found in the appendix (Table 22, 23, 24 and 25) . We observe that the diagonal values are not zero, which is the same as we observed in the results for FG and FGS applied to a single model. We hypothesize a potential reason is that the gradient directions of different models in the ensemble are orthogonal to each other, as we will illustrate in Section 6. In this case, the gradient direction of the ensemble is almost orthogonal to the one of each model in the ensemble. Therefore searching along this direction may require large distortion to reach adversarial examples.
For targeted adversarial examples generated using FG and FGS based on an ensemble model, their transferability is no better than the ones generated using a single model. The results can be found in the appendix (Table 29, 30, 31 and 32) . We hypothesize the same reason to explain this: there are only few possible target labels in total in the 1-D subspace.
GEOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF DIFFERENT MODELS
In this section, we show some geometric properties of the models to try to better understand transferable adversarial examples.
The gradient directions of different models in our evaluation are almost orthogonal to each other. We study whether the adversarial directions of different models align with each other. We calculate cosine value of the angle between gradient directions of different models, and the results are presented in Table 8 . We observe that all non-diagonal values are close to 0, which indicates that for most images, their gradient directions with respect to different models are orthogonal to each other.
Decision boundaries of the non-targeted approaches using a single model. We study the decision boundary of different models to understand why adversarial examples transfer. We choose two normalized orthogonal directions δ 1 , δ 2 , one being the gradient direction of VGG-16 and the other being randomly chosen. Each point (u, v) in this 2-D plane corresponds to the image x + uδ 1 + vδ 2 , Table 8 : Average cosine value of the angle between gradient directions of two models. Notice that the dot-product of two normalized vectors is the cosine value of the angle between them, for each image, we compute the dot-product of normalized gradient directions with respect to model i (row) and model j (column), and the value in cell (i, j) is the average over dot-product values of all images. Notice that this table is symmetric. We can observe that for all models, the region that each model can predict the image correctly is limited to the central area. Also, along the gradient direction, the classifiers are soon misled. One interesting finding is that along this gradient direction, the first misclassified label (non-targeted) is the same for all models except VGG-16 and GoogLeNet. For this particular example, the light green region corresponds to the label "orange". When we look at the zoom-out figures, however, the labels of images that are far away from the original one are different for different models.
On the other hand, in Table 9 , we show the total number of regions in each plane. In fact, for each plane, there are at most 21 different regions in all planes. Compared with the 1,000 total categories in ImageNet, this is only 2.1% of all categories. That means, for all other 97.9% labels, no targeted adversarial example exists in each plane. Such a phenomenon partially explains why fast gradientbased approaches can hardly find targeted adversarial images.
Further, in Figure 5 , we draw the decision boundaries of all models on the same plane as described above. We can observe that
• The boundaries align with each other very well. This partially explains why non-targeted adversarial images can transfer among models.
• The boundary diameters along the gradient direction is less than the ones along the random direction. A potential reason is that moving a variable along its gradient direction can change the loss function (i.e., the probability of the ground truth label) significantly. Therefore along the gradient direction it will take fewer steps to move out of the ground truth region than a random direction.
• An interesting finding is that even though we move left along the x-axis, which is equivalent to maximizing the ground truth's prediction probability, it also reaches the boundary much sooner than moving along a random direction. We attribute this to the non-linearity of the loss function: when the distortion is larger, the gradient direction also changes dramatically. In this case, moving along the original gradient direction no longer increases the probability to predict the ground truth label (see Figure 7 in the appendix). Figure 4: Decision regions of different models. We pick the same two directions for all plots: one is the gradient direction of VGG-16 (x-axis), and the other is a random orthogonal direction (y-axis). Each point in the span plane shows the predicted label of the image generated by adding a noise to the original image (e.g., the origin corresponds to the predicted label of the original image). The units of both axises are 1 pixel values. All sub-figure plots the regions on the span plane using the same color for the same label. The image is in Figure 3 .
VGG-16
Model VGG-16 ResNet-50 ResNet-101 ResNet-152 GoogLeNet # of labels 10 9 21 10 21 Table 9 : The number of all possible predicted labels for each model in the same plane described in Figure 4 .
• As for VGG-16 model, there is a small hole within the region corresponding to the ground truth. This may partially explain why non-targeted adversarial images with small distortion exist, but do not transfer well. This hole does not exist in other models' decision planes. In this case, non-targeted adversarial images in this hole do not transfer.
Decision boundaries of the targeted ensemble-based approaches. In addition, we choose the targeted adversarial direction of the ensemble of all models except ResNet-101 and a random orthogonal direction, and we plot decision boundaries on the plane spanned by these two direction vectors in Figure 6 . We observe that the regions of images, which are predicted as the target label, align well for the four models in the ensemble. However, for the model not used to generate the adversarial image, i.e., ResNet-101, it also has a non-empty region such that the prediction is successfully misled to the target label, although the area is much smaller. Meanwhile, the region within each closed curve of the models almost has the same center.
REAL WORLD EXAMPLE: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR CLARIFAI.COM
Clarifai.com is a commercial company providing state-of-the-art image classification services. We have no knowledge about the dataset and types of models used behind Clarifai.com, except that we have black-box access to the services. The labels returned from Clarifai.com are also different from the categories in ILSVRC 2012. We submit all 100 original images to Clarifai.com and the returned labels are correct based on a subjective measure.
We also submit 400 adversarial images in total, where 200 of them are targeted adversarial examples, and the rest 200 are non-targeted ones. As for the 200 targeted adversarial images, 100 of them are generated using the optimization-based approach based on VGG-16 (the same ones evaluated in Table 5) , and the rest 100 are generated using the optimization-based approach based on an ensemble of all models except ResNet-152 (the same ones evaluated in Table 6 ). The 200 non- targeted adversarial examples are generated in the similar ways (the same ones evaluated in Table 2 and 7).
For non-targeted adversarial examples, we observe that for both the ones generated using VGG-16 and those generated using the ensemble, most of them can transfer to Clarifai.com.
More importantly, a large proportion of our targeted adversarial examples are misclassified by Clarifai.com as well. We observe that 57% of the targeted adversarial examples generated using VGG-16, and 76% of the ones generated using the ensemble can mislead Clarifai.com to predict labels irrelevant to the ground truth.
Further, our experiment shows that for targeted adversarial examples, 18% of those generated using the ensemble model can be predicted as labels close to the target label by Clarifai.com. The corresponding number for the targeted adversarial examples generated using VGG-16 is 2%. Considering that in the case of attacking Clarifai.com, the labels given by the target model are different from those given by our models, it is fairly surprising to see that when using the ensemble-based approach, there is still a considerable proportion of our targeted adversarial examples that can mislead this black-box model to make predictions semantically similar to our target labels. All these numbers are computed based on a subjective measure, and we include some examples in Table 10 . More examples can be found in the appendix ( Table 10 : Original images and adversarial images evaluated over Clarifai.com. For labels returned from Clarifai.com, we sort the labels firstly by rareness: how many times a label appears in the Clarifai.com results for all adversarial images and original images, and secondly by confidence. Only top 5 labels are provided.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we are the first to conduct an extensive study of the transferability of both non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples generated using different approaches over large models and a large scale dataset. Our results confirm that the transferability for non-targeted adversarial examples are prominent even for large models and a large scale dataset. On the other hand, we find that it is hard to use existing approaches to generate targeted adversarial examples whose target labels can transfer. We develop novel ensemble-based approaches, and demonstrate that they can generate transferable targeted adversarial examples with a high success rate. Meanwhile, these new approaches exhibit better performance on generating non-targeted transferable adversarial examples than previous work. We also show that both non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples generated using our new approaches can successfully attack Clarifai.com, which is a black-box image classification system. Furthermore, we study some geometric properties to better understand the transferable adversarial examples. Table 11 : Top-5 accuracy of Table 2 . Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted optimization-based approach with a learning rate of 4. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. The cell (i, j) indicates the top-5 accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) evaluated over model j (column). Lower value indicates better transferability. Table 4 . Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted FG. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. The cell (i, j) indicates the top-5 accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) evaluated over model j (column Table 13 : Top-5 matching rate of Table 5 . The adversarial images are generated using the targeted optimization-based approach with a learning rate of 4. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated for model i (row) when evaluated on model j (column). Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels.
RMSD 30 Table 6 . Matching rate of adversarial images generated using targeted optimization-based approach. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) is predicted as the target label by model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels.
RMSD 17 Table 7 . The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 accuracy of the non-targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Lower value indicates better transferability.
RMSD 1.25 0% 86% 87% 93% 96% Table 16 : Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted optimization-based approach with a learning rate of 0.125. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. The cell (i, j) indicates the top-1 accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) evaluated over model j (column). Lower value indicates better transferability. Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in Table 17 . Table 18 : The adversarial images are generated using the targeted optimization-based approach with a larger learning rate. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-1 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated for model i (row) when evaluated on model j (column).
Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels. We used a larger learning rate to achieve larger RMSD. Results of top-5 matching rate can be found in Table 18 . The adversarial images are generated using the targeted optimization-based approach with a larger learning rate. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated for model i (row) when evaluated on model j (column). Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels. We used a larger learning rate to achieve larger RMSD.
RMSD 23.11 12% 27% 25% 22% 15% Table 20 : Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted FGS. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. The cell (i, j) indicates the top-1 accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) evaluated over model j (column). Lower value indicates better transferability. Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in Table 21 . Table 22 : Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted ensemble FG. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-1 accuracy of the non-targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Lower value indicates better transferability. Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in Table 22 . Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted ensemble FG. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 accuracy of the non-targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Lower value indicates better transferability. Table 24 : Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted ensemble FGS. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-1 accuracy of the non-targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Lower value indicates better transferability. Results of top-5 accuracy can be found in Table 24 . Transferability between pairs of models using non-targeted ensemble FGS. The first column indicates the average RMSD of the generated adversarial images. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 accuracy of the non-targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) when evaluated over model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Table 29 : Transferability between pairs of models using targeted ensemble FG. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-1 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) is predicted as the target label by model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels. Results of top-5 matching rate can be found in Table 29 . Transferability between pairs of models using targeted ensemble FG. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) is predicted as the target label by model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels. Table 31 : Transferability between pairs of models using targeted ensemble FGS. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-1 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) is predicted as the target label by model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels. Results are top-5 matching rate can be found in Table 31 . Transferability between pairs of models using targeted ensemble FGS. The first column indicates the average RMSD of all adversarial images generated for the model in the corresponding row. Cell (i, j) indicates that top-5 matching rate of the targeted adversarial images generated using the ensemble of the four models except model i (row) is predicted as the target label by model j (column). In each row, the minus sign "−" indicates that the model of the row is not used when generating the attacks. Higher value indicates more successful transferable target labels. 
